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ordinary humanity. We do not consider it an argument against their recommendations that divorce would be thereby increased. There would be no reason for making the proposed changes, if no one were to avail themselves of the greater facilities. If there is a demand for a grade of marriage which is not permanent, it is arguable that it is better to recognize it, than to leave the way free for the promulgation of 'advanced' views under cover of 'hard cases.' But it is a wise saying that hard cases make bad law; and the legislator will have to move very carefully if he is not to cause more suffering than he relieves.

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## THE ETHICS OF INDUSTRY.

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I N primitive society the moral elements of experience were as immediately present in carrying on the processes of labor and industry as they were in the processes of education and religion. That the Nazarites among the early Hebrews, of whom Samson was one, took a vow to sow no seed, to drink no wine, to build no houses, but to live in tents, shows that the methods of industry in the earlier nomadic period were inseparable from current moral and religious ideals. Later on, when the old nomadic life had given place to agriculture, this new economic process was just as essentially religious and moral as the old nomadic ideal. As a proof of this we need only refer to the fact that an ordinary citizen, Naboth by name, could hold his family estate, "the inheritance of his fathers," even against the desires of the king (I Kings 21 : 3). The primitive nomadic, and the later agricultural, method of life was therefore an inseparable aspect of a certain moral and religious view

of life and of the world. And the more highly developed society shown in the ancient city, the best examples of which are the Greek and Roman city-states, shows us an ideal of conduct in which industrial processes were a part of the ruling moral and religious theory of life. The processes of nature, growth, birth, disease, death, the seasons, the wind, the tides were one and all manifestations of divine powers. There was accordingly no way of separating the religious and moral aspects of experience from the industrial processes.

But the separation of morality from industry came nevertheless. Development reveals differentiation, and the differentiation of morals from industry came about in a perfectly natural way. Greek philosophical materialism explained the processes of nature as due to material atoms acting according to purely mechanical laws. And, apart from this explicit materialism, the development of the scientific spirit led to the conception of the objective world of nature as an order governed by mechanical laws. A physical world controlled by 'mechanical' law came to be distinguished from the mental world of human experience; in this way the world of will-values, or the moral world, was clearly separated from the world of natural processes, or the industrial world. Growth, disease, the seasons, spring time and harvest were no longer regarded as the inexplicable will of spiritual beings, but as natural facts and processes subject to human control, the degree of this control depending on the extent of scientific knowledge. At a certain stage of development the priest was a conspicuous and central figure. But with the growth of science, the world was more and more regarded as the field of exact forces and laws. In this way there grew up a separation of the secular and the religious: a part of life was given to business, to money-making, to labor; another part was devoted to religion, to faith in personal values.

Another development helped to bring about the differentiation of the moral from the industrial world. This

was a change in the meaning of religion. Primitive religion concerned itself with the actual given world of men and of nature regarded as a living thing. Religion concerned itself with nature as a living thing and with the most dynamic phases of human life. But the centuries preceding and following the Christian era saw a profound change in the religious ideal. Religion ceased to concern itself with the world. A new attitude developed,—the attitude of world-denial. Religion,—and as much of morality as the religious experience implies,—retreated from the actual given world of labor and industry; it ceased to concern itself with the old interests which made valuable and moral the present system of things. Religion ceased to concern itself with flocks and grain and fruitful showers and the seasons, with the world of industry, and began to deal with inner, personal, virtues and sins.

In the older days sin could not have been personal; it could not have been limited to the inner will, to the attitude of mind. In the narratives of Samson and Naboth sin and virtue had to do with the way in which daily life-earning occupations were carried on. But with the transition to an ethics and a religion of world-denial, the deepest conscience of the whole Græco-Roman world was taken out of the present life altogether. The Pythagoreans, the Orphic cult, the Cynics, the Stoics, the Essenes, were all tinged with the new ethics of world-denial, strong evidences of which are seen even in Plato. The effect of this new ethics on the world of business, industry, commerce, and agriculture, was that this world, which in the old view had been permeated with moral and religious significance, became a purely secular world. From the passing of the old Hebrew, Greek, and Roman religions, clear down through the Middle Ages, there obtained this contrast of the secular world and the world of moral and religious ideals.

This separation of the world of religion and morals as an inner world from the world of industry and material

things, was, however, possible only in theory. As a matter of fact monasticism accepted the institution of industry, but interpreted it as a discipline of the soul. The Holy Roman Empire, inherited the institutions of the old world-order, among which was the institution of property; even the Church, with its ethics of world-denial, had its great landed estates. The feudal system continued the institutions of property and industry, derived from the old pre-Christian régime, down to modern times. In this system full political rights belonged only to owners of land. These land-owners were the nobles, who were set off from the rest of their fellows by special proprietary privileges.

Against this system of inherited landed rights there grew up the modern doctrine of freedom of contract. But this freedom of contract was at first applied in a limited fashion only to a privileged property-owning class; indeed it is thought by some that our own Revolutionary fathers, who framed the constitution, had primarily in mind the protection of property as the fundamental purpose of law. As an example of the working of this doctrine of individual freedom, we have the recent celebrated court ruling that a law which limits the hours of labor in the interest of health is unconstitutional, on the ground that it is contrary to the principle of individual freedom of contract. Freedom so conceived is an abstraction, not a reality, for where the alternative is starvation or overwork, how is the individual free to choose? The individual will divorced from the social aspects of experience is an abstraction, a fiction. If wages are insufficient to support a family, how can the constitution make the individual who is not an ascetic free to contract for his wages? If wholesale prostitution is directly connected with low wages, in what sense is the individual free to enter an industrial contract? If steam and electricity have concentrated the materials of production in a few hands, if, in other words, the laborer can have practically no property, in what sense is he free to acquire an

interest in the product of his labor? If he has no provision against sickness or old age, in what sense is the workman free or in what sense is there an industrial contract?

The new doctrine of freedom of contract, like other forms of modern freedom, had to grow by degrees. The freedom of the intellect, which began in the Renaissance; the freedom of conscience, which began in the Reformation; the freedom of scientific investigation, whose foundations were so securely laid in the seventeenth century; the political freedom, which produced a revolution in government in England, in America, and in France, this new freedom was thought of for centuries as a highly abstract thing and, therefore, in each case, took on a form of protest against established institutions, and was, accordingly, known as Individualism. The same is true of the development of the idea of freedom of contract in the world of industry. This new idea of industrial freedom, like the idea of political freedom, was at first interpreted in a wholly negative fashion. It meant the right of each one to get all the wealth he could, in any way that did not seem legally to interfere with a like freedom in others. This individualistic doctrine is not positively destructive in an agricultural régime where land is easily available; but where free land is no longer open and where steam and electric power have concentrated the processes of industry in the hands of a capitalist class, the new doctrine of freedom becomes the instrument of industrial oppression.

The divorce between ethics and industry which grew up in the transition from the primitive to the civilized stage of development, to which we have previously alluded, is strangely enough being reënacted to-day. A purely secular view of industry is expressed in the phrase, 'business is business.' Steam and electricity and the limited liability corporation have fostered a complex industrial organization whose immediate object is no longer a social exchange of value, but a definite profit on capital. In this

way industry has become commercialized; labor has become standardized into pieces and hours,—it has become impersonal. The product of labor has become abstracted from an interested will, producing a false and artificial dualism of experience. What incentive to genuine creative activity can exist where the producer has no sense of ownership whatever in his product? The two chief occupations of primitive man were hunting and war; emotional color and instinctive interest were inseparable from such activities. There was no sharp distinction between work and play; indeed primitive labor,—hunting and fishing,—is modern sport. Play activities are devoid of such effort and strain as are experienced in work. Play is associated with the instincts, and all really great work is related to one's fundamental instincts. Civilization means labor, sustained attention, strain; hence the origin of a type of theology which conceives of heaven as an eternal rest. The expulsion of man from the Eden of his early life comes to signify the curse of labor. If routine deprives the laborer of enjoyment and interest, is not some sort of psychological reaction unavoidable? Strain must be offset by recreation; the emotional loss in the daily routine must be made good; this means a limit to the hours of labor. If industry is to make primarily for life and only secondarily for profit, then the individual is free to contract for his labor only under conditions that are in harmony with his nature and its needs. And human nature demands a family, education, religion, recreation, physical health, sickness and old age pensions, etc.

To separate the world of industry from the world of moral values is to take from the world of work,—where the normal individual spends practically his life,—the only touch of idealism without which industry becomes vulgar. This is the necessary moral result of separating the outer or physical world from the inner or mental world; indeed this modern distinction between material and moral values, true and helpful if rightly used, in

actual practice often stands in the way of moral, social, and political progress. No matter what the metaphysical truth as to the reality of the material world may be, from the standpoint of practical life, Fichte is right in defining it as the material through which we may work out our duties in the world. Material things are goods; they have their value only in relation to human needs and desires. Food, health, clothing, property, are moral matters as well as physical matters.

Specialization in the world of trades and professions is in its essence a division of labor, for experience proves that one can produce more effectively by giving his time and energy to some one process. Individuals differ in their physical and mental characteristics so that specialization allows the best expression of individuality. This would seem to point to specialization as a means of social service. But specialization means that, instead of each individual producing largely what he consumes, as in primitive society, each one is producing for financial profit. Competition is the heart of the process; and more recently collectivistic methods have enabled specially competent individuals to build up trusts and monopolies. This union of collectivistic methods and individualistic ideals is the despair of modern industrial ethics. Not only have we not succeeded in devising laws to prevent the growth of overwhelming monopolies, but we have not even succeeded in socializing our business ideals. Laws can only formulate public opinion. We are in need of an ethical awakening in business ideals such as we are now passing through in political ideals. We must outgrow our individualistic ideals in business and industry as we are fast outgrowing them in political theory. Specialization must come to mean social service as well as individual initiative. The social interpretation of religion will greatly aid in this development.

Specialization, from one point of view, means regularity of activity devoid of emotional interest. But such activity may mean that each individual is realizing the



best that is in him. Civilized man must be a specialist; each can do best one line of work; this is self-expression. There is also a social phase of this matter, for social groups are formed according to interests held in common. Here is the basis of coöperation, which is a great gain. Furthermore, industrial education will enable the individual to discover his most efficient tendencies and capacities, and this will teach each one the related subjects so that there will be a social meaning in highly specialized work. From such a point of view specialization becomes a means of socialization as well as of differentiation. It is also possible for education to make the materials of the shop a means of teaching history, sociology, government, geology, geography, anthropology, art. Manual training can teach mathematics, domestic science can teach chemistry. Thus the narrowness of modern industrial specialization can be overcome, for wider areas of selfhood can be opened to view within the realm of one's daily occupation. This will give wider content to industry and new motive to education; it will give perspective to industry and interest to education, and will, accordingly, vitalize both industry and education.

Modern science has marvelously improved the technique of industry. It is said that the packing houses turn to profit every part of the pig but its squeal. This is as it should be; but there are other phases of industrial evolution, and they concern the laborer himself. The problems of drink, amusements, leisure hours, health, the family, industrial education, the instincts of coöperation and ownership, are only a few that might be mentioned. Are not these questions just as important in the solution of labor problems as those concerning the efficiency of machinery? The proprietor of the saloon or the dance hall is far ahead of the captain of industry in his knowledge of the psychology of the laborer, and his financial returns have not decreased on account of his applied psychology.

Rauschenbusch is correct in saying that industry is our conspicuous unregenerate social institution. The spirit of our other important institutions is being rapidly transformed by a constructive social idealism: religion is fast outgrowing its classical individualistic form; the family is essentially a social institution; education has been thoroughly permeated with Christian idealism and the spirit of social service; the State is no longer an external force to compel obedience; even the individualistic theory of the State,—itself based on the notion of freedom,—is being rapidly outgrown in modern political theory. Industry alone is predominantly under the control of a ruthlessly competitive and immoral individualism. Our industrial theory and practice are in principle unchanged by the higher type of social ethics which comes from the teaching of Jesus. Profit for the individual in opposition to the social good is the immoral result of a false individualism. The individual must view his industrial life in the light of his relations to society. Industry can never be moral as long as it is individualistic; property, industry, land, taxes, the products of labor, must be viewed from the point of view of the community as well as from that of the individual. If, as Jane Addams points out, the community could organize and control its amusements and recreations, it would not only do away with the vicious aspects of commercialized amusements, but it would also give the community valuable experience in social control which might later secure gas, electricity, transportation, ice and pure milk, without the graft characteristic of private monopoly. When steel rails, defective because of haste in production, continue to cause death in railroad accidents; when the lives of workmen are lost because the introduction of a new invention will decrease profits; when cold-storage plants are used to raise the cost of food instead of lowering the cost, as they should do; when tariff-protected goods are sold abroad cheaper than at home; when a coal trust raises the price of coal while charity attempts to keep

the poor from freezing; when public amusements are commercialized for private profit; when taxes on buildings keep the wage-earner from owning his home while vacant lots, whose enormous value is made by municipal growth, are held by individuals to reap the value which the community has created; when such things are the usual ways of business, is it any wonder that moral ideals seem rather hazy and vague? Is it any wonder that they are not so compelling in their influence on conduct as the more tangible percentage of business? In the light of such facts, do not our moral ideals seem rather empty and abstract?

Now this is not because we moderns are mostly hypocrites. It is because the crying moral defects of our age are of a social nature, because they concern our corporate life, while the moral and religious ideals that have ruled the West for two thousand years deal fundamentally with sins and virtues that are personal, private, individual. Some of the most conspicuous leaders in our industrial immoralities are equally conspicuous as representatives of the ethics and religion of the old individualistic type. These industrial sins are not sins of the heart and the will, sins of the inner life; they are not due to bad intentions and evil desires; they are due to the fact that an individualistic ethics has prevented us from regarding each self in his relations to his total social environment. If it is true that no individual can be understood except in and through his social relationships, then it is equally true that no individual can be moral save in and through these same social relationships.

According to the standards of the current individualistic type of morals, men like Washington, Jefferson, and Grant are definitely condemned; for the first swore outrageously, the second was skeptical of saving truth, and the third was reported to President Lincoln as intemperate in the use of whisky. Nevertheless our political ethics is so much more social than our industrial ethics that these three men stand out like beacon lights of pub-

lic virtue! We condemn drunkenness far more than the manufacture of the whisky which leads to drunkenness; the one is clearly a private vice; the other is a questionable industrial process. Sexual vice is universally condemned, but the industrial conditions which grant young girls a wage of six or seven dollars per week and drive thousands to vice as a means of support are not so generally condemned. If one individual kills another individual, he is universally regarded as a murderer, but if a great corporation kills hundreds through defective steel rails, no one is seriously blamed.

When the Israelitish State passed into the hands of Babylon and Persia and Greece, the Hebrew prophet ceased to be the counsellor of kings. He hoped for divine interference because he had no control over the making of laws; hence the apocalypse of Daniel. When the early Christians found themselves in a similar condition in the Roman Empire, another apocalypse was put forth in the book of Revelations. We, on the other hand, are not under Babylon or the Roman Cæsars; our government is our own corporate will. Our public industrial and political order is no less an expression of our moral and religious life than the more individual phase of experience with which our traditional moral and religious life has concerned itself. This is not realized to-day because our moral ideals have been inherited from Judaism and early Christianity, which embody the ideals of a period when the industrial and political order, being in the power of an authority external to the moral will, was regarded as extraneous to the moral consciousness. The one order was within and was the result of moral choice; the other was from without and necessitated a wise yielding to force. But this individualistic type of ethics is now hopelessly inadequate because the laws of the State and of industry are no longer imposed upon us from without. They therefore must become the corporate expression of our moral life. In so far as industry and politics do not reflect our moral ideals, they will necessarily annul our

personal and private morality,<sup>1</sup> for individual and public morality are but different aspects of one underlying moral life. The individual moral will does not function in a vacuum but only in a social medium.

Primitive social life and the old Hebrew, Greek, and Roman life, emphasized those virtues which were pre-eminently social in character. The religion, the family life, the state laws, the educational theory and practice of this period, worked harmoniously toward the building up of public life. China and Japan and India hold up before our view to-day this old social ideal as it existed in the West before the rise of the individualistic type of ethics which has ruled Western thought since the days of Socrates. We cannot go back to a type of ethics whose group ideals left no place for the development of the inner life of the individual. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the social foundations of conduct, because we have developed a sense of individuality of which ancient civilization was not aware. For two thousand years Western civilization has been developing and protecting the individual virtues. Socrates withstanding his city; Jeremiah preaching a spiritual, in the place of an hereditary Israel; St. Paul substituting the law of liberty for the law of his nation; Marcus Aurelius fighting as a Roman emperor, but telling us in his "Thoughts" that only the city of Zeus is real; Luther, Rousseau, Hume, Thomas Jefferson, William James, these are some of the names about which our greatest ethical battles have been fought; and every step gained is a precious possession of Western thought. Nevertheless, in the development of the individual, when reason and will lead to a newer sense of self, which fails to correlate itself with the deeper social aspects of experience, there results confusion, inefficiency, and maladjustment. And history teaches the same lesson in the moral evolution of the race.

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<sup>1</sup> This point is emphasized in Rauschenbusch's "Christianizing the Social Order."

We have learned this lesson in the spheres of the family, of religion, and of education; many of us have learned it in the field of politics, but we have hardly faced the problem in the field of industry. The recent unprecedented moral awakening in the political field, however, has thrown the searchlight of moral vision over the field of industrial ethics also. One of two things must happen: either religion, the family, the school, and the State, will moralize our mammonized industry, or an immoral industry will demoralize them. Let us strive that in this family of institutions the majority of four to one shall rule!

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